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NOTES.
THE iIGHT OF A MOTHER TO RECOVER FOR INJURIES TO
HER MINOR CHILD.-In the month of June, 19o6, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania handed down a decision which is an
interesting illustration of the continual striving of tribunals
toward an equitable interpretation of the law, and of the
somewhat tortuous methods which have frequently to be
employed in order to arrive at the results desired. The case
referred to is that of O'Brien v. The City of Philadelphia,
215 Pa. 407 (Advance Sheets), and the question involved,
the right of a mother to recover compensation for an injury
to her minor child, whom she is supporting.
The action was brought by the child against the City for
damages for personal injuries, and also by the mother, Louisa

NOTES.

O'Brien, (the father having deserted her ten years before) for
compensation for the loss of the child's services; the jury
returned a verdict of $3500 for the former and $500 for the

latter. The defendant appealed from the second verdict.
Chief Justice Mitchell in delivering the opinion of the Court,
said, "The right of action of a father for injury to a child
was based on his duty of support, and his consequent right
to the services of the child. The common law, which paid
no heed to merely sentimental considerations or matters of
feeling, put the action on a basis of master and servant.
Even the most serious of all, the seduction of a daughter,
was redressed as an injury to the father as master, per quod
servitium amisit. The mother, being under no obligation to
support, had no corresponding right to service. This was
the state of the law when the act of June 26th, 1895, P. L.
316, was passed-

"The mother who without compulsion voluntarily does
what the father is under legal obligation to do,--i.e support
the child-shall have the same equal right to the custody
and service as is now by law possessed by the father. In
the present case, if the father were now supporting the child,
his right of action would be unquestioned. As he is not
doing so, but the mother is, her right to the services is by
the statute the same as his would be, and her right to sue for
their loss must necessarily be the same."
The entire ground of this decision is obviously the interpretation of a statute. Let us see how that statute reads.
Act of June 26th, 1895, P. L. 316. Section I. "That hereafter, a married woman who is the mother of a minor child,
and who contributes by the fruits of her own labor or otherwise towards the support, maintenance and education of her
said minor child, shall have the same and equal power, control and authority over her said child and shall have the
same and equal right to its custody and services as is now
by law possessed by her husband, who is the father of such
minor child. Provided however, "That the mother of such
minor child is otherwise qualified as a fit and proper person
to have the control and custody of said child."
Judge Mitchell's reasoning is clear. Once grant the mother's
right to custody and services, once establish the tortious
deprivation of those services, and the right to compensation
accrues. The gist of the action, then, is loss of service. The
statute has no bearing on the relation of parent and child as
such, it merely establishes, under certain conditions, the relation of mistress and servant where apparently it did not
exist before.
Was there no such natural relation of service between
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mother and child at the common law? Certainly, as the
law was understood in Pennsylvania, there was not. The
question was definitely settled by the Supreme Court in 1867,
in the case of The Fairmount and Arch St. Passenger Ry Co.
v. Stutler, 54 Pa. 375. The action was by a widowed mother
for injuries to her i9 year old son while alighting from one
of the defendant's tram-cars. The boy lived with his mother,
was occasionally employed in odd jobs, and turned over to
her all the money he earned. Judge Hare left the case to
the jury, and they returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but on
appeal the Supreme Court reversed the judgment, saying:
"The evidence was sufficient, had the action been by a father,
to establish the relation of master and servant, and it is in
right of such a relation, rather than in her character of parent,
that the mother claims damages in this action. There was
no evidence of any express contract between the mother
and son by which she was entitled to his services, and at law
she has no implied right to them."
But the same year, Judge Woodward, who pronounced
this opinion, in deciding an action brought by a widow for
the death of her minor son, (Penn. R. R. v. Bantom, 54 Pa.
495), after admitting her right to recover under the Act of
1855, said: "Thus far the Legislature have compelled us to
go. We keep step with them, and limit the mother's right
to a case of death, and not of maiming, because they have
changed the rule of the common law no further than this."
There is nothing equivocal about this decision, nothing
qjualified, here is no opposition of legal principles nor balancing of conflicting authorities. Most evidently the law is
looked upon as definite, incapable of other interpretation.
Let us see whether this conclusion will stand the test of
authority.
From the earliest stages of human society the right of the
father to the custody of his children, and to the value of their
services up to a certain age, has been undisputed. The
Romans carried it to an extreme, granting the father the
power of life and death over his household, and continuing
certain of his powers of control through an indefinite span of
years, or placing no limit on them whatever. The common
law of England, while never admitting the father's powers
to so extreme a degree, yet extended to him an almost complete control over his children during their minority, withholding only acts so flagrant as to be prejudicial to the natural
rights of a human being, in which category the early English
jurists, unlike the Romans, saw fit to rank a man's children.
The theory of this doctrine seems to have been that he who
gives life to a being is bound by moral law to maintain it
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during its period of helplessness, which the law fixes as the
first twenty-one years of its existence. Therefore a father
was held legally responsible for the support of his children,
and the laws considered that this responsibility carried with
it a corresponding right to all the reciprocal advantages which
might be gained from the children during this period of
maintenance. Hence the privilege of requiring a child's
services and appropriating his earnings, the right to control
his property, to govern his marriage, and other similar prerogatives, all vested in the father.
The common law grew up in an age when the earning
population, or at least that recognized as such, was wholly
male. On the death or desertion of a father, the family were
permitted to get along as best they might; the law cast no
duty on the mother to maintain them. Hence there being
no duty to support, there was no correlative right to service
or control; no influence whatever save a moral one. "The
legal power of a father," says Blackstone, (1.4 53),-"for a
mother, as such, is entitled to no power, but only to reverence
and respect,-the power of a father, I say, over the persons
of his children, ceases at the age of twenty-one."
"Where a child was injured as a result of a tortious act he
had, in common with an adult, his action against the tortfeasor for the pain and suffering caused by the injury. But
he was entitled to no compensation for the loss of his time
and earning capacity, for he was held to have no right to
these, so their loss could mean nothing to him. In the father
vested this right, his was held to be the privation, and to
him was given the remedy. Here then is the origin of the
doctrine that all rights of a father to compensation for injuries to his children are based on the loss of service. "Where
a child suffers wrong, he has his action for the personal injury.
But besides this, the parent may usually claim indemnity
for loss of his child's services, to which should be added the
incidental expenses incurred in consequence of the injury.
Hence arises a cause of action in the parent, per quod, the
foundation of which is the loss of the child's services-"
Schouler " Domestic Relations "p. io5.

At first blush it would seem that there would be no hardship in not granting a similar right to the mother, for the
child, on the father's death and in the absence of a guardian,
being entitled to the value of his own services, it would appear reasonable that he could recover for their loss. But
there were certain situations in which this was not possible.
A notable instance was that of the civil action for seduction.
The gist of this action by a fiction of the law, has always
been held to be loss of service to the parent of the female
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seduced, or to the one entitled to her services, no right of
action, under any circumstances, lay with her, all such right
having been vitiated by her consent to the wrong. Here
then, in the event of the father's death, and in the absence-of
a guardian, the right of action must be in the mother or in
nobody, so here we have the issue squarely before us. And
here the authorities disagree.
In South v. Denniston, 2 Watts 474 (1834), the Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania denies the right, saying: "Not being
bound to the duty of maintenance, a mother is not entitled
to the correlative right of services, and standing as a stranger
to her daughter in respect to these, the relation of mistress
and servant can be constituted between them but as it may
be constituted between strangers in blood, save that less
evidence would perhaps be sufficient to establish it."
In New York the contrary is held--Gray v. Durland, 50
Barber ioo, Furman v. Van Sise, 56 N. Y. 435. This doctrine
is generally followed in this country. "Any one entitled to
the services of a female may sue for her seduction," says Webb
in "Pollock on Torts," P. 278 n. "Any person who stands in
loco parentis, as a stepfather, or grandfather, or guardian,
where the facts prove the relation of master and servant, can
imaintain such suit. Or the mother, where she becomes the
head of the family by the death of the father." And he cites
a large number of cases in various jurisdictions in support of
the rule.
Here is one class of cases in which a number of courts have
seen fit to relax the hard and fast rule of the logical negative,
and recognize the relation of mistress and servant between a
mother and daughter. But the action for seduction is placed
upon the foundation of service only in form; it is an extension
by the courts of this form to the more serious offence, the
substance being in reality the grief and mental anguish of
the afflicted parent, and the measure of damages based thereon. So when, as in the case we are discussing, the substance
as well as the form of the action, and consequently the damages awarded, are fixed on the standard of loss of earning
power, so ready a laxity on the part of the courts is scarcely
to be expected. Yet the tendency has been strongly set in
that direction all through the nineteenth century, in this
country at least.
Says Reeve in 1888 (Domestic Relations p. 369): "The
older cases hold that the mother, after the father's death, has
no right to the services of the minor child, nor is she liable,
as the father is liable, for the support of such child. But the
better modem authority is in favor of the principle that on
the death of the father the mother has the same right to the
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authority and services of a minor child that the father had
in his lifetime."
Various courts have applied this doctrine in various ways.
Where by interpretation of the common law or by statute,
the duty is cast upon the mother of maintaining the child,
when able to do so, courts have uniformly held her entitled
to custody and services, and hence to compensation for their
loss. In Massachusetts they have held it to be a common
law duty-(Nightingale v. Worthington, 15 Mass. 270, and

Dedharn v. Natick, 16 Mass. 134). In the latter of these cases
the court lays down the rule: "The mother, after the death
of the father, remains the head of the family. She has the
like control over the minor children, as he had when living.
She is bound to support them, if of sufficient ability; and they
cannot, by law, be separated from her." This is also the state
of the law in Connecticut, (Matthewson v. Perry, 37 Conn. 35)
and in New Jersey, (Campbell v. Campbell, 3 Stockton, 265).
In other states the obligation has been created by a legislative enactment, designed to reduce pauperism, and requiring
any father or grandfather, mother or grandmother, children
or grandchildren of every poor person not able to work, to
support them if of sufficient ability. This rule is hinted at by
the New York Court of Appeals in Furmanv. Van Sise, supra:
"She may maintain such action based upon the right to service
and the loss thereof. Also upon the statutory duty upon her
to support her indigent child, if able to do so."
Where, however, no such obligation is cast upon the mother,
the courts of certain states have granted her a right to her
child's services upon another ground. The New Hampshire
court states this doctrine in Riley v. Jameson, 3 N.H. 23:
"While a mother actually supports her children at her own
expense, she is entitled to their services, and they may perhaps be presumed to be in her employment." In other
words, admitting that no duty of support was laid upon the
mother by the law, and that consequently no correlative
rights could be presumed, they hold that, where she voluntarily assumes the maintenance of her children, she acquires
thereby those rights which are considered inseparably connected with the obligation. The decision of the same court
in Hammond v. Corbett, 50 N. H. 5o, is based upon this
presumption.
Indeed it is upon this principle that the Pennsylvania
Statute is founded: "A married woman, who is the mother
of a minor child, and who contributes by the fruits of her
own labor or otherwise, toward the support, maintenance and
education of the said minor child," etc. Under such a statute,
finally, the mother has acquired this right in Pennsylvania
29
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and certain other jurisdictions in which the courts have not
seen the way clear to granting it to her uponany other grounds.
This is the situation in Maryland (County Commissioners v.
Harford, 6o Md. 340), and in Indiana (Rwy Co. v. Willouby,
43 N. E. 1058). Still others continue to deny the right entirely; in Pray v. Gorham, 31 Maine 240, the opinion sets

out that "if it is intended to declare that the mother, after
the death of the father, is entitled to the services of a minor
child, in the same manner as the father while alive was entitled to them, the position cannot be maintained." At least
this was the state of the law in Maine in 185o; whether it
has since been changed or not the writer of this article has
been unable to ascertain.
Altogether a situation sufficiently complicated, yet presenting solutions any one of which might readily have been
accepted by the Pennsylvania courts of the early nineteenth
century. Yet so strong was the tendency in the other direction, and so binding the effect of the decision in Ry Co. v.
Stutler, Supra,that even after the passage of the enabling act,
in the case of Kelly v. Traction Co., 204 Pa. 623 (1903),
Judge Brown threw out the dictum that "until the legislature
gives the mother the right to sue in a case of injury to a minor
child, caused by the negligence of another, and not resulting
in death, we cannot give it to her." True the court here did
not have the problem squarely before them, for, as the case
stood, the child's father was alive at the time of the accident,
and died pending the suit; the mother, being substituted in
her personal capacity, acquired of course, no rights which
she could not have claimed when the injury was suffered.
Yet the language of Judge Brown would give rise to the
inference that, even under the facts of the present case, the
court of 1903 would scarcely have construed the act so as to
cover it. Not until the present year, when the question came
unavoidably before them, did they see their opportunity to
overcome an ancient and unjust doctrine, the reason for which,
if any ever had existence, has long since passed away.
Robert T. McCracken.
BREACH OF PROMISE TO-WHETHER EVIDENCE THAT
DEFENDANT SEDUCED PLAINTIFF IS ADMISSIBLE IN AGGRAVATION OF DAMAGES.-In Bouvier's Dictionary we have the

following definition of damages: "The indemnity recoverable
by a person, who has sustained an injury either, in his person,
property or relative rights through the act or default of
another. Turning to Sedgwick we find that evidence of
mental suffering due to seduction may be offered in fixing the
damages.
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The "jury are instructed that they may consider the following elements of damages, (1) disappointment of plaintiff's
reasonable expectation and the loss caused thereby . . . ;
(2)
injury to her affections; (3) mortification and distress
resulting from defendants refusal to fulfil his promiseIn 2 Starkie under the head of Breach of Promise of Marriage
we are told that any circumstances which enable the jury
to appreciate the loss sustained by the plaintiff are admissible
in evidence in aggravation of damages.
To quote from the American Law Encyclopedia: "The
authorities it is believed all agree in holding that mental
injuries may constitute an element of damages. A person's
mind it has been said being no less a part of his person than
his body and indeed sufferings of the latter." (Syer v. Barkhamsted 22 Conn. 290.)
"Evidence to aggravate damages means nothing more than
that evidence is admissible of facts and circumstances which
would go in aggravation of the injury itself."
With this thought as to what should constitute proper
indemnity in an action such as that under consideration, we
are prepared to consider the attitude of the various courts.
The general rule undoubtably is that damages in actions of
contracts are to be limited to the consequences of the breach
of contract, and that no regard is to be had to the motives
which induced the violation of the agreement.
Viewing the question from a strictly contractual point of
view, one would be inclined-to deny the admission of such
testimony, on the maxim of volenti non fit injuria. In other
words in as much as the woman is particeps crtminis she has
no legal rights or logical grounds upon which to complain in
a court of justice (Burke v. Shain 2 Bibb. Ky.), rather it
would be decidedly irrational to permit one to voluntarily
enhance damages by acts aggravated by himself. It might
also be a question whether if this were permitted, seduction
would then be less frequent. In line with this thought let
us quote the words of Judge Parker in Peck v. Peck, i2 R.
I., 485: "It seems to us that social morality will not be promoted by relieving either sex of legal responsibility for voluntary action."
Judge Breese, in his dissenting opinion in Fidlerv. McKinley
21 Ill., 316, goes so far as to say that he entertains grave
doubts as to whether any really good and virtous woman has
ever brought or ever will bring a suit of this nature.
It seems to us that the whole problem revolves about the
one pivot whether every woman is unchaste who has
been seduced. Some jurisdictions maintain that a woman,
no matter what the circumstances may be, is in pari delicto
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with the man in a criminal offence, that the act of seduction
was not contrary to her will however basely it may have been
obtained. (Gibson J., in Weaver v. Bachert, 2 Pa., 8o).
On the other hand, an engagement brings the two parties
into an intimate and confidential relation due largely to the
fidelity, love, and implicit reliance which each should bear
toward the other and which woman by her natural proclivities is prone to place in man. To take advantage of these
relations is a palpable breach of trust, as flagrant as any act
committed by a trustee, guardian or confidential adviser,
who betrays a dependant ward, beneficiary or client. To
subsequently rudely abnegate a promise of a person whose
confidence has been invaded and basely abused, whose citadel
and strong fortress of virtue has been taken and razed to the
ground, should be a very relevant fact in determining the
damages (Sheahan v. Barry, 37 Mich., 218).
In considering the cases bearing on this subject we discover
three classes: (i) those in which seduction was committed
prior to the promise of marriage (Baldy v. Stratton, 2 Pa.,
8o); (2) those in which the promise was merely a means
to an end as the evidence plainly indicates (Wells v. Padgett,
8 Barb., 323); (3)those in which the promise was made in
good faith prior to the seduction, but which for some reason
or other has been broken.
One might very naturally expect in regard to these three
different divisions, diverse views and opinions. For example
in Espy v. Jones, 37 Ala., 379, it was held that if evidence of
seduction can be received in any case to aggravate the damages, it is only where seduction follows the promise, and is
affected by means of it; seduction prior to the promise is not
admissible evidence. While some jurisdictions draw clear
distinctions, mindful of these three divisions; others pay no
regard to subtle reasonings or finely spun logic, but will either
admit or deny such evidence.
There seems to be no fixed rule in this country upon this
subject. Massachusetts decisions have been in the affirmative
following Sherman v. Rowson, 102 Mass., 395, and Kelley v.
Riley, io6 Mass., 337. The decisions of the supreme courts
of New Jersey, Illinois, Missouri and Tennessee are all to the
same effect. In some states (Califorina, Indiana, Iowa, and
Tennessee) statutes have gone to the extent of providing that
an unmarried woman may maintain an action for her seduction. In Pennsylvania on the other hand they take the opposite
opinion, relying upon Baldy v. Stratton, ii Pa., 316, and
Weaver v. Bachert, 2 Pa., 8o. The propriety of these Pennsylvania decisions has been questioned (Kniffen v. McConnell,
30 N. Y., 285). It does not appear that in these two Penn-
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sylvania cases the question has been squarely met. In the
former the promise was made subsequent to the seduction
and then only to screen the degradation and disgrace of its
effects. In the latter there is no clear or direct evidence that
the defendant had entered into an engagement to marry.
Judge Gibson among other things said: "But a more grave
objection lies in the want of evidence that there were mutual
promises or any promises at all." In both cases there is no
evidence whatsoever which shows that there was a betrayal
of a well grounded belief in a promise of marriage.
One of the strongest lines of argument against'its admission
is found in Judge Breese's dissenting opinion-a very ably
drawn view, in Fidler v. McKinley, 21 Ill., 316. He points
out that what is said in Paul v. Frazier,3 Mass., R. 71, upon
which a great many decisions are based, is solely obiter dictum.
What Judge Parsons says in this case is: "She is a partaker
of the crime and cannot come into court to obtain satisfaction
for a supposed injury to which she was a consenting party,"
but in elaboration he says: "If seduction has been practiced
under color of that promise, the jury will undoubtably consider it as an aggravation of the damages." This obiter dictum
of Judge Parson has been so frequently refered to, in cases
where the present point has been at issue and has been directly met and decided. It is so thoroughly the attitude of
such a large number of courts that has become authoritative
in its significance.
Judge Breese places strong reliance on the principle that
a woman is in pari delicto and by reason of that position has
no right to use a crime in which she is a co-partner for her
own benefit (Burk v. Shain, 2 Bibb. Ky). "It was unquestionably a wrong in which the defendant had debauched the
plaintiff but it was a wrong of which she was partcepscrimmn-s
and has no right to complain in a court of justice." For mere
seduction there can be no action upon the principle of volenti
non fit injuria (Mainz v. Leders, 21 R. I., 370). But it would
seem that evidence of seduction under promise of marriage
should be introduced in accordance with justice, higher ethics
and social morality. This view was assumed in Turner v.
Vaughan, 2 Wilson 399, where a bond had been given in
consideration of passed cohabitation and was declared valid.
In like manner the court enforced a contract for the settlement of a case of fornication and bastardy, Rohrheimer et al. v. Winters Supreme Court of Pa., 1889 (126
Pa. 352).
The female and her seducer can hardly be considered on
equal grounds (Well v.

Padgett, 8 Barb., 323).

The two

parties in the majority of cases can hardly be considered as
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being in pari delicto. Lord Mansfield in Morton v. Tenn (Q
Doug. R., 211) says: "Where seducti6n is accomplished
through a promise of marriage, which the seducer never
intended to perform, it is a fraud on his part and I can not
but think it an abuse of language to say that the parties
are in pari delicto." True the action is in contract but the
procedure partakes largely of the nature of a tort (Wallace
v. Coil, 24 N. J.) and the damages should be left to the sound
discretion of the jury. There being no rule to apply to the
damages it would seem that the plaintiff is entitled to recover
compensation for all the mental anguish she has experienced
in consequence of the breach of contract of marriage. The
jury should exercise their sound judgment under all the circumstances of the case (Hattin v. Chapman,46 Conn., 607.)
Judge Breese (Fidlerv. McKinley supra) gives a further
reason for the exclusion of the evidence of seduction viz:
because promise of marriage cannot be introduced in aggravation of damages in a suit for seduction brought by a parent
or party in loco parentis. (Foster v. Schaffield Johns., 297,
Henry v. Jestr, 2 Houst. Del., 66).
2 Starkie states that "the jury in a case of this nature are
instructed that they are not confined to, in their estimate of
damages from loss of service and the expenses consequent
upon the seduction, but may award a compensatory for the
loss which the parent has sustained in being. deprived of the
society of his child. It seems, though the contrary has been
asserted, that evidence to show the defendant prevailed by
means of a promise of marriage is admissible, for this is
proper evidence of the extent of the injury and means used
to perpetrate it, which in all cases where the jury are to assess
damages, seems to be material for their consideration. Starkie's
view is followed in the cases: Franklin v. McCorkle, 16 Lea
(Tenn.); White v. Campbell, 13 Gratt (Va.) 573; Hadkins v.
Haskins, 22 W. Va., 645. There seems however to be a good
reason why such should not accrue to a parent's benefit.
Surely he does not suffer more by loss of the contract, and
that is the sole legal ground upon which his action is allowed
(Well v. Padgett, 8 Barb., 323). But who would contend that
a daughter does not suffer more in a breach of promise by
reason of her seduction. Moreover when there is no parent,
or person in loco parentis, what hope is there of introducing
seduction in any action?
This latter view of Judge Breese has been reinforced against
the admission of such evidence, lest the defendant be subjected to double vindictory damages, were parent likewise
to bring action (Febbs v. VanKleck Trent J. in dissenting
12 Ill., 466).
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The maxim that no one shall be twice vexed for the same
cause will prevent any defendant from being twice sued for the
same damages. If they can be recovered in this action under
the pleadings a recovery would necessarily be a bar to any
future action. This subject was recently considered in
Leonard v. Pope supra 45, (Sheahan v. Barry, 27 Mich., 22).
But even if he should suffer the same damages twice, has
he not injured two parties, and why should she, whose future
has been blighted, be denied her proper compensation
(Leavitt v. Cutler, 37 Wis., 46).
In a recent case, Wrenn v. Downey, 63 Atl., 401, Judge
Gibson follows the reasoning of Judge Breese which we have
considered at some length. In addition to the points already
given he says that in as much as the tort was the result of an
injury occasioned by her own act and another's her contributory negligence bars all action. An answer is found in Bennet
v. Bean, 42 Mich., 346, which holds that even though the
suffering caused by seduction was the result of her voluntary
act it is not the immediate cause, and would never have arisen
had the defendant fulfilled his part of the contract, and hence
the fact that she was seduced under plaintiff's promise should
necessarily go a great way in fixing damages.
A defendant, if he proves that a plaintiff had sexual intercourse with a third party, mitigates damages arising from a
breach of promise of marriage. (Dupoint v. McAdow, 6
Mont., 277).
Would it not seem in accordance with justice, that, if he
were the only aggravator, the only person who had seduced
the plaintiff that such evidence should be admitted against
him, especially when the act was perpetrated under the
promise of marriage?
A defendant cannot be heard to plead in reduction of
damages that the injury would not have been accomplished
had his own improper advances been resisted (Sherman v.
Rowson, 102 Mass., 364 relying on Landen Littlehole v. Joel
Dix, ii Cush., 364). In the latter case it was decided that a
party guilty of assault and battery cannot show that, from
the intemperate habits of the other party the injury was
more aggravated than it would have been upon a person of
temperate habits.
The seducer is directly responsible for the injuries. His
act is just as grave even if the resistence to his approaches
were weak. A strong sentence which is thoughly in keeping
with modem ethics is in Sheahanv. Barry, 27 Mich., 22 1. "The
common sense of mankind has approved the rule which hold
the seducer responsible" in a promise of marriage.
The following cases deny such admission: Tubbs v. Van-
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Kleck, 12 Ill. R. 446, Conn v. Wilson, 2 Overton (Tenn.) R.
233, Boynton v. Kelley, 3 Mass. R. 189, Whalen v. Layman,
2 Black R. 194, Mainz v. Lederer, 21 R. I. 370, 375, Matthew
v. Cribbett, ii

Ohio, 330.

While on the other hand these cases answer the question
affirmatively: Burks v. Shain, 2 Bibb. 343, Geen v. Spencer,
Missouri R. 194, Baldy v. Stratton, 3i Penn. Stat. R. 123,
Perkins v. Hersey, i R. L. 493, Conlon v. Cassidy, 17 R. I.
518, 23 Atl. ioo, Weaver v. Bachert, 2 Penn. St. R. 321.
Warren K. Miller.

